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with information on computer components 
and continuing with detailed sessions on 
the use of specific software like Microsoft 
Windows and Word. They also learned how 
to perform calculations in Microsoft Excel 
and other functions in Microsoft Office pro-
grams. With this knowledge, group members 
plan to teach other mine victims. Participants 
also organized a series of English-language 
and computer courses for the children of mine 
victims, conducting 16 lessons in English and 
14 lessons in basic computer skills for chil-
dren in four months.
Further Collaboration
As an offshoot of their initial training 
sessions, participants in the Mine Victims’ 
Association process began collaborating with 
journalists, doctors, local politicians and rep-
resentatives of national demining organiza-
tions. Group members expressed a desire to 
improve and expand the initiative among 
mine victims to provide necessary assistance 
on a regular basis. Plans were solidified for 
the future activities of the MVA, including 
activities in several Terter district villages. 
In November 2006, members of the na-
tional and international media were invited 
to the Terter region to become acquainted 
with the work of the IEPF and the Azerbaijan 
National Agency for Mine Action. Meetings 
with orthopedic representatives of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross 
were held in December 2006 to better un-
derstand the needs of mine victims in the 
Terter region. The dialogue resulted in the 
recognition of a need for regional specialists 
in orthopedics since the nearest facility, in 
Baku, is too distant for many mine victims.
In meetings with local political leaders 
and executive members, mine victims partic-
ipated in direct dialogue with the authorities 
responsible for addressing the mine problem 
in the Terter district and across Azerbaijan. 
Authorities noted concerns surrounding the 
determination of disability, provision of so-
cial and medical assistance and other issues 
related to problems facing mine victims.
A meeting between ANAMA and mem-
bers of the MVA was held in November 
2006 to discuss the successes of the associa-
tion to date. The sustainability of the MVA 
was one of the most pressing issues, includ-
ing the broader goal of assisting mine vic-
tims throughout Azerbaijan.
Mine-victim Entrepreneurs
Many of the participants in the MVA 
seminars have started or furthered their 
own businesses in the Terter district based 
on information and support provided in the 
workshops. Three participants—Nizami 
Bardary, Khalil Hatamov and Mohammed 
Shirinov—are currently involved with seed-
ing activities and one—Nuru Gouliev—
with beekeeping. Most of the mine-victim 
entrepreneurs make four to five times their 
annual pensions from their salaries. 
Despite their injuries, these mine victims 
are actively contributing to their local econo-
mies—and they are part of a larger trend to-
ward increased personal independence with 
vital assistance programs. Beyond providing 
valuable services, these entrepreneurs are in-
tegrating into society and serving as models 
for other mine victims.
Long-term Goals and Enduring 
Challenges
Umud Miryzoyev is proud of the accom-
plishment of the Mine Victims’ Association 
for the Terter district of Azerbaijan, but 
much remains to be accomplished in assist-
ing mine victims and their families integrate 
fully into society.
Miryzoyev says the MVA will help estab-
lish more agricultural units in accordance 
with mine victims’ business plans, conduct 
vocational courses for victims and their fam-
ily members, and provide new job placements 
to further improve socioeconomic status. All 
these undertakings will be accomplished “to 
support the mine victims as they settle their 
most important problems,” he adds.3
Plans are already underway to improve 
the repair process on prosthetic appliances, 
Miryzoyev says. “Mine victims have to leave 
for Baku or Ganja cities, and, of course, they 
have some difficulties in doing it,” he says.3 
The IEPF is currently preparing information 
on how easy repairs can be made without the 
need for extensive travel. But all problems 
have not been that easy to solve.
Miryzoyev notes that providing assis-
tance to mine victims who must be treated 
and rehabilitated abroad is incredibly dif-
ficult. The MVA also faces difficulty in 
implementing the prepared business plans 
for seminar participants. “Great support is 
needed to improve the mine victims’ socio-
economic state, to establish their farm units, 
to realize individual business plans and to 
assign social aid to mine victims in poor liv-
ing conditions,” he says.3 
There is also the problem of addressing 
the needs of mine victims in other regions 
of the country. Regional branch offices will 
soon begin to tackle complex vocational, 
medical, juridical and social problems in 
other areas of Azerbaijan. The IEPF is look-
ing to expand further to give greater atten-
tion to other villages as branch offices of the 
Azerbaijan Mine Victims’ Association are 
prepared in Aghstafa, Baku and Fizuli.
See Endnotes, Page
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Mine victims of the Terter branch of the Azerbaijan 
Mine Victims Association at the computer course.
Seeding field of mine victim Nizami Bardary in Terter.
T hose wanting to solve the problems caused by anti-personnel mines had high expectations when the Ottawa Convention was adopted on 18 September 1997. After all, this event oc-
curred little more than 17 months after the Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons2 failed to meet expectations in addressing 
the problems caused by anti-personnel mines. Indeed, the CCW’s 
marginally enhanced restrictions on the use of anti-personnel mines 
were deemed by the President of the International Committee of the 
Red Cross to be “woefully inadequate” and “unlikely to significantly 
reduce the level of civilian landmine casualties.” Even the United 
Nations Secretary-General criticized the U.N.’s own vehicle for ad-
dressing humanitarian concerns associated with conventional weap-
ons when the Secretary General said he was “deeply disappointed” by 
the inability of the CCW to produce results.3
Unlike the CCW, the Ottawa Convention met the expectations 
of those wanting a comprehensive approach to solving the problems 
caused by AP mines. But in meeting one expectation, states of the 
world created another. As noted by Croatia’s Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Affairs when the Convention was opened for signature in 
December 1997, “We should bear in mind that we have not complet-
ed our journey yet. We have merely obtained a tool that will enable us 
to reach our final goal.”4
Implementing the Ottawa Convention in Southeast Europe: 
Meeting Expectations in a Challenging Environment
by Kerry Brinkert [ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ]
As the 10-year deadline for fulfilling Article 5 of the Ottawa Convention1 is rapidly approaching for the first 
States that ratified or acceded to the Convention, each State Party faces the requirement that all known 
anti-personnel mines be destroyed. The author examines the progress and challenges that remain in 
Southeast Europe regarding Article 5 implementation.
The Expectations and Challenges Ottawa Presents
The journey referred to involves addressing both external and in-
ternal expectations. When a state ratifies or accedes to the Convention, 
externally, other states expect that state to fulfil the obligations it has 
freely accepted. In addition, internally, a state’s population will or 
should expect the state to do what is obliged of it to end the suffering 
and casualties caused by AP mines. In few other instances are the 
internal and external expectations as high and the challenges as great 
as they are in Southeast Europe (SEE).5
The expectations in SEE are high because the states of this region 
have in recent memory experienced the devastation of armed conflict 
in which anti-personnel mines have been used and have remained 
as a deadly legacy. As the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina remarked in December 1997, all parties to war in that 
country supported the Ottawa Convention “because we experienced 
what the use of AP mines means and we know that we should do 
everything not to allow this to happen again.”6 
The challenges, however, are great, not only due to the magnitude 
of the problems, but also because fulfilling state responsibilities has 
been complicated in SEE. For instance, every state in the region has 
recently been in some form of transition in terms of the establish-
ment or re-establishment of state structures or in terms of transition 
While great progress has been made in SEE in implementing Article 5, some states 
in the region continue to face great challenges. Seen here is a minefield warning sign 
in Croatia.
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from pre- to post-Cold War state structures. Moreover, 
some SEE states lack the means to completely fulfil state 
responsibilities on their own.
Challenges notwithstanding, every SEE state 
has expressed its consent to be bound by the Ottawa 
Convention.7 In doing so, each state has created expecta-
tions that significant mine-action progress will be made 
and that the ultimate desired impact, an end to suffering 
and casualties for all people for all time, will eventually 
be realised. On 18 September 2007, a decade will have 
passed since the Convention was adopted; States Parties 
are now on the eve of a judgment day for progress in 
meeting these expectations. 
In accordance with Article 5 of the Convention, States 
Parties ultimately are expected to do three things:
1. Each State Party must “make every effort to 
identify all areas under its jurisdiction or con-
trol in which AP mines are known or suspected 
to be emplaced.”8
2. Each State Party identifying such areas must 
“ensure as soon as possible that all AP mines in 
mined areas under its jurisdiction or control are 
perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by 
fencing or other means, to ensure the effective ex-
clusion of civilians, until all AP mines contained 
therein have been destroyed.”8
3. Each State Party identifying such areas must “de-
stroy or ensure the destruction of all AP mines in 
mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as 
soon as possible but not later than ten years after 
the entry into force of this Convention for that 
State Party.”9
Hence, the endstate that is expected of States Parties 
is nothing more or less than that which is stated in 
Article 5. On the one hand, the Article makes no ref-
erence to States Parties striving to become “mine free” 
or “mine safe” or “impact free”—all of which are terms 
that, while in frequent use, are operationally ambigu-
ous, legally undefined and often politically loaded. On 
the other hand, the Article is straightforward in indicat-
ing that compliance is nothing short of “the destruction 
of all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or 
control”—mined areas that each State Party would have 
made “every effort to identify.”10 This is the defined endpoint and the expectation 
for completion created by the States Parties of Southeast Europe when they ratified 
or acceded to the Convention.
Macedonia: Meeting the Expectation of Completion
Macedonia recently articulated the endpoint for Article 5 implementation 
well in its 15 September 2006, Declaration of Completion, which clearly and 
unambiguously states, “The Republic of Macedonia declares that it has de-
stroyed all AP mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control in which AP mines 
were known or suspected to be emplaced, in accordance with Article 5 of the 
Convention. The Republic of Macedonia declares that it completed this obliga-
tion on 15 September 2006.”11
Macedonia also illustrated that in reaching this endpoint, States Parties can 
use the common sense that realistically suggests they need not scour every last 
square metre of their territory to determine the presence or absence of AP mines. 
Common sense also suggests that it is impossible to assure with absolute cer-
tainty that every last mine has been located and removed from identified mined 
areas. Macedonia demonstrates this good sense by stating in its Declaration of 
Completion, “In the event that previously unknown mined areas are discovered 
[after 15 September 2006], the Republic of Macedonia will: 
1. Report such mined areas in accordance with its obligations under 
Article 7 and share such information through any other informal 
means such as the Intersessional Work Programme, including the Standing 
Committee meetings;
2. Ensure the effective exclusion of civilians in accordance with Article 5; and
3. Destroy or ensure the destruction of all AP mines in these mined areas as 
a matter of urgent priority, making its needs for assistance known to other 
States Parties, as appropriate.”11
Of course, common sense also dictates that States Parties must establish a high 
degree of confidence that all necessary measures have been taken. Macedonia il-
lustrated its commitment to building such confidence by providing clarity with 
respect to the standards being applied and the means of verification and quality 
assurance being used. In doing so, Macedonia alluded to the International Mine 
Action Standards,12 which outline what can and should be done in mine action 
by defining a “demining process” and hence providing guidance to States Parties 
in proceeding with tasks such as: identifying mined areas, establishing a national 
demining programme, locating and removing/destroying AP mines, and assuring 
that a high standard has been achieved in mine clearance and related activities. No 
state is obliged to use the IMAS as its set of standards; however, should individual 
States Parties wish, they can use the IMAS as guidance in establishing national 
standards for operational actions in order to meet expectations in fulfilling their 
legal Ottawa Convention obligations.
BiH and Croatia:  More Time is Required
While Macedonia was able to fulfil its obligations in a 10-year period, it was 
understood when the Convention was adopted that some States Parties may need 
more time “to destroy or ensure the destruction of all AP mines in mined ar-
eas under [their] jurisdiction or control.”9 In accordance with Article 5.3 of the 
Convention, States Parties may request an extension for a period of up to 10 years. 
Indeed, this understanding was made clear by the Foreign Minister of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in 1997 when he stated that “we are aiming to comply with the 10-
year time limit and do not want to consider an extension yet but the reality of our 
problem may make this the only solution.”6
BiH and Croatia have indicated that their challenging environment means 
they will not reach Article 5 completion in a 10-year period. This, however, does 
not represent a failure to meet expectations; claiming such would ignore the legal 
provisions in the Convention to request extra time and disregard these States’ 
considerable efforts to date in proceeding to fulfil their obligations. 
Rather, BiH and Croatia are well-placed to claim success in meeting expecta-
tions if:
1. They achieve by 2009 “a status of work conducted under a national demin-
ing programme that one could reasonably expect after a 10-year period” 
given the challenging environment in 
which they find themselves. 
2. It is clear that a detailed plan is in 
place to enable each to declare com-
pletion in as short a time period as 
possible after 2009.13
Being able to claim interim success in 
meeting expectations, though, will be no 
easy matter. Making decisions on whether 
to grant extensions will be a serious affair for 
States Parties. As Croatia itself remarked in 
September 2006, “the extension possibility 
is not there to serve as an excuse to mine-af-
fected States Parties for making every effort 
‘to destroy or ensure the destruction of all 
AP mines in mined areas under their juris-
diction or control,’ but as a necessary tool” 
… “a vehicle for the full implementation of 
the Convention and not a means for getting 
around it.”14
“SMART” Strategies for Implementing 
Article 5
BiH and Croatia are not only well-poised 
to use the extension provision of Article 5 as 
a “vehicle for the full implementation of the 
Convention,” but they may also be good ex-
amples to other States Parties regarding how 
to communicate the matter of meeting 10-
year expectations of progress in implemen-
tation. Good work has been done and those 
responsible should take pride in their ef-
forts. The task with respect to the extension 
request is now to say what has been done, to 
explain the impeding circumstances and to 
say what will be done.
A template for preparing extension re-
quests has been developed and enhanced by 
Canada and is ready for consideration by the 
States Parties at their November 2007 meet-
ing.15 Ultimately, though, this is a voluntary 
guide and there is nothing stopping States 
like BiH and Croatia from proceeding with 
the task at hand. In doing so, it is advisable 
that States Parties be as “SMART” as possi-
ble with their achievements and goals—that 
is, specific, measurable, achievable, relevant 
and time-bound. They can articulate mat-
ters that are specific and relevant to the actual 
obligations of the Convention and quantify 
matters to the extent possible. In addition, in 
communicating what will be done in the fu-
ture, they can again be specific, measurable 
and relevant, but also communicate matters 
that are achievable in a time-bound manner.
For a State Party like BiH, its Landmine 
Impact Survey report may be a good start-
ing point. After all, the report in part claims 
that it “establishes baseline data for mea-
suring progress.”16 Consequently, questions 
that naturally may be on the minds of States 
Parties evaluating a request for an extension 
might be:
• What means have been used to verify 
whether there indeed are mined areas 
within these suspected hazard ar-
eas? In the process of doing so, what 
amount of the suspected hazard areas 
originally logged has been released 
and how much remains?
• Of the areas identified to contain AP 
mines, what is the total area in which 
Article 5 obligations were fulfilled? 
What means were used to fulfil these 
obligations and to assure quality? 
How many AP mines were destroyed 
and how many other explosive rem-
nants of war destroyed?
• How much area and which areas re-
main in which Article 5 obligations 
must still be fulfilled? Of these, which 
areas have been and have not yet been 
perimeter-marked, monitored and 
protected by fencing or other means, 
to ensure the effective exclusion of 
civilians? What is the estimated date 
for destroying or ensuring the de-
struction of all anti-personnel mines 
contained within each area identified 
as containing AP mines?
• If area remains in which anti-per-
sonnel mines are suspected to be 
emplaced, what is the basis for the 
continuing suspicion and what is the 
estimated size of each area? What is 
the estimated date for determining 
whether mined areas indeed exist in 
suspected hazard areas?  
Conclusion
Over the past year, the Convention 
community has discussed with great inter-
est the Article 5 extension request process. 
However, it is important to recall a point 
the Convention’s President made at the 
Seventh Meeting of the States Parties:17 
“Work on an extensions process should not 
be seen as an alternative to fulfilling Article 
5 obligations.”18That is, the extensions pro-
cess is all about communicating that interim 
expectations have been met. Actually being 
in a position to meet Article 5 obligations 
means continuing to carry out the impor-
tant work of survey, land release, detection 
and destruction. 
Also in this regard, while BiH and 
Croatia may require the use of the extensions 
request process, the Seventh Meeting of the 
States Parties’ Geneva Progress Report19 re-
corded that Albania has provided details on 
national demining plans that are consistent 
with fulfilling Article 5 obligations by the 
Convention’s 10-year deadline. Therefore, 
Albania should soon be able to declare, 
as Macedonia has, that it has fulfilled its 
Article 5 obligations, and Serbia may be in a 
similar position in due course. 
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Croatia is one of the SEE states that has made 
significant progress in implementing Article 5 since 
the Convention entered into force. Pictured here 
is a scene of a demining operation near Petrinja, 
Croatia, taken 18 October 2006.
 The Ottawa Convention defines a “mined area” as “an area which 
is dangerous due to the presence or suspected presence of 
mines.” Meeting expectations in implementing Article 5 means en-
suring with confidence that all such areas ultimately will no longer 
be considered dangerous.
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